4 relationships between firms' managers and government officials (and their staffs) are complex in that the firm generally has relationships with government officials from different levels of the government (i.e., local governments and local chapters of the political party) that pre-date the visit of the higher ranking official. Thus, while the consensus of the experts is that this particular form of CPA -the visit -is ultimately requested upon the firm by senior government officials, it is unlikely that the invitation is offered without prior relationships between the firm's managers and officials at some levels of government.
For this study, we seek to understand whether third-party investors value the firms' hosting visits, and if so, what information might visits convey such that investors bid up the hosting firms' stock prices. Starting from the assumption that third parties face information asymmetry (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973) about certain aspects of the firm that creates uncertainty about the firm's future value, the visit offers information to such third parties. First, the visit might signal the resources that the government is able to direct in the future to the visited firm or its sector. Government-controlled resources, such as subsidies, taxes, and regulations, might be promotional in nature, aimed at promoting the firm's products or services in domestic or international markets or protectionist, aimed at shielding weak firms or firms in distressed sectors from market conditions. Second, the visit might act as a form of certification (Shane & Foo, 1999) by government officials about the company, in which the hosting firm's interaction with the President or the Premier -both high status exchange partners -elevates the firm's reputation (Rindova et al., 2005) and legitimacy (Deephouse and Carter, 2005) . Both of these pathways also assume that high ranking government officials desire to visit companies with commercial activities congruent with their preferred public policies.
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The context of our study, China, is particularly relevant to investigate the influence of high-level official visits on firm evaluation by investors. Specifically, we focus upon the stock market effects of Chinese companies that hosted visits of the two senior-most central government of China, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, during the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . Both collectively possessed enormous substantive and symbolic power through their positions as head of state and head of the government and as primary leaders (i.e., General Secretary, Politburo members) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Kuhn, 2002) . The visits of high ranking officials may result in offers of general praise and support about the economy or the sector, a collective outcome. For example, during a visit to several high tech companies and industrial parks in Shanghai in January of 2010, President Hu in a public speech emphasized the importance of research as a driver of sound and fast economic growth and social development (China View, 2010 ). Yet, visits may also signal the importance of only the hosting firm. For example, during his 2008 visit, Premier Wen publicly praised Baosteel's R&D activities and product advances in their silicon steel products (Baosteel, 2008) , a high-profile endorsement for the company from an industry lagging behind its international rivals in product quality and production efficiency (Ernst & Young, 2013) . Though it may lag important global competitors, the firm provides necessary employment opportunities. In a country where the capital market is less developed and public firms' disclosure is lacking, hosting visits may help investors reduce information asymmetry and better evaluate hosting firms' possibilities of receiving future government-controlled resources as well as certifying the firm's reputation and legitimacy.
The results of our analysis of 84 government official visits hosted by Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] show that, on average, firms witnessed statistically significant positive abnormal market returns by hosting the President's and Premier's 6 visits, outperforming a matched-set of non-hosting firms. The main result supports predictions that such visits convey valuable information to investors about expectations for future government-controlled resources and provide a boost to hosting firm's reputation and legitimacy.
Additionally, we consider several firm-level contingencies that may be related to investors' perceptions about the firm's access to government supplied resources and the certification effect about the firm's reputation and legitimacy, including profitability, ownership type (private ownership versus state owned enterprise, SOE), top management's political connections, and the institutional development in the location of the hosting firm. The results of the analysis of these contingency factors indicate that less profitable firms and privatelycontrolled firms (not SOEs) witnessed higher levels of positive abnormal market returns.
Compared with otherwise similar SOEs, less profitable and private firms may be less flexible in accessing financial resources and the visit may signal that the government will provide some sort of promotional or protective assistance because they typically receive less state support such as access to credits and other subsidies and experience more bureaucratic or regulatory burdens (Jia, 2014) . For firms facing challenges to their reputation, such as those with weaker profitability (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990) , and less socio-political legitimacy, such as being private rather than state-controlled, visits may signal to investors that the firm will continue to be a viable entity, a form of social validation (Rao, 1994) .
Our study contributes to the scholarly literature about CPA in three important ways. First, we examine company site visits, a form of CPA which allows a firm's managers to make intimate contacts with high level officials. We argue that visits represent an emergent form of CPA, emanating from the firm's long history of complex relations with government officials.
Additionally, site visits are heavily publicized events, elevating the reputation and legitimacy of 7 the hosting firms more so than private meetings. Second, this paper considers the payoffs of emergent CPA in a context of an authoritarian state where firms face policy uncertainties due to power discrepancies and lack due process vis-a-vis governmental actors. This advances the CPA literature because it suggests that under such conditions hosting high profile government officials conveys information to third parties (i.e., investors) about expectations about the firm's future access to government-controlled resources as well as its reputation and legitimacy. Third, this paper joins the emerging set of studies that examine private (as opposed to collective) CPA in China (Jia, 2014; Jia, Shi, and Wang, 2012; Kennedy, 2005; Li and Zhang, 2007) and other emerging countries (Henisz, 2000) . With the rapid ascendance of emerging economy firms in the global economy, it is important for scholars to shed light on how firm-government interactions in these settings can influence firm value creation.
INFORMATIONAL EFFECTS OF HOSTING VISITS
Before discussing the effects of visits on hosting firms, we briefly describe what we are able to observe about these visits by senior Chinese government officials. Visits of senior government officials garner extensive media coverage and may be considered as public relations events (Kennedy, 2005: 50) . From reading Chinese news accounts (Appendix I provides a summary of ten visits), we observed that the President and the Premier were inclined to visit firms that appeared to represent exemplars of particular government policies. For example, on to NARI Technology Co., Ltd., Premier Wen emphasized the importance of "Scientific Outlook on Development" and "Sustainable Development" policies to the company's growth. News accounts recounted that the President and Premier also visited firms facing harsh external 8 conditions. For instance, during his visit to Sino-Platinum Co., Ltd. on July 26, 2009, President Hu encouraged the firm to capitalize on its own strengths to overcome the economic challenges triggered by the global financial crisis. In October of 2009, promoting economic reform policies during the global financial crisis, President Hu visited SHINVA, the first medical equipment manufacturing firm owned by the CCP, and encouraged its top managers and employees to strengthen their technology and service innovations.
For this study, we have interviewed several experts in Chinese business-government relations and none of them could identify a set of rules or a protocol that governed such visits.
Nothing official is published about hosting visits. These experts speculate that the choice of a visit ultimately comes from the office of the senior government officials, but involves a complex and long series of interactions between the company's managers and various governmental officials across different levels of government, plus potentially non-governmental social interactions (e.g., born in the same city, common schooling, and common military service), such that the company becomes a target for such a visit. While companies are ultimately chosen by the government officials, the managers at the hosting companies may have taken prior actions to improve their chance of hosting visits. In contrast to determinant conceptions of CPA strategy, we argue that hosting visits represents an emergent (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) CPA strategy, in which a visit emerges after a series of moves and events between company officers and many government officials. Certain actions and events may seem minor and seemingly inconsequential at the time but end up resulting in a significant outcome such as a visit (Allison, 1971) .
The question for this study is what financial benefits flow to a company practicing this particular form of CPA, especially since hosting a visit is more public and entails many direct (i.e., planning, security, logistics, public relations, etc.) and indirect (i.e., lost time due to planning the visit) costs that other forms of CPA do not. 1 The dominant assumption underscoring much of the CPA literature is that managers consciously choose to engage their firms in political activities. Oliver and Holzinger (2008) write, "Strategic political management refers to the set of strategic actions that firms plan and enact for the purpose of maximizing economic returns from the political environment" (p. 496. Emphasis added). The CPA literature commonly asserts that firms undertake a rational cost-benefit calculation to direct CPA (i.e., lobbying a legislative member or joining an industry coalition in producing a 'white paper' about an issue) towards issues that look to be most advantageous to the firm (Bonardi, Hillman, and Keim, 2005; Henisz and Zelner, 2012; Hillman and Hitt, 1999) . Firms may also choose to undertake CPA to imitate others (Gray and Lowery, 1996) and to cement social relations between their managers and government officials (Mizruchi, 1992) , presumably when the benefits exceed the costs. A contribution of our study is that net benefits may also flow to firms that host visits of powerful political leaders, even when the deliberate nature of strategic choice is obfuscated.
Due to information asymmetry, investors face the challenge of evaluating the quality of firms. This is particularly true in China where public firms' disclosure is limited and shareholder activism is rare (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005) . High information asymmetry between firms and investors lead investors to rely on other information cues to make investment decisions. We posit that hosting visits by top government officials appears to affect expectations about firm performance through two pathways: (1) signals about future flows of government-controlled resources; (2) certification effect about the reputation and legitimacy of the host. We discuss successively both pathways. Another form of expected government-controlled resources might be via protection.
Certain firms and sectors of the economy serve important public functions, such as providing employment, fostering regional development (i.e., a large mine in a remotely populated region), and enhancing national security (Gilpin, 1987) . However, during the period of the study, the commercial prospects for some of these firms were dire. The visit may show that the government is willing to "prop up" such ailing firms or firms in ailing sectors, including some larger and Corporation, a company providing important social benefits through employment, and urged the firm to accelerate the pace of transforming traditional industries with advanced technology. The visit of the high ranking politician shows that the he is willing to stake his own reputation on such a public event. The visit may assuage investors who face uncertainty in evaluating whether the government will be willing to support firms with resources and favorable regulations.
The second path linking hosting a visit to investors' reaction is via certification. The certification literature considers the effect of a company's affiliation with prominent others, such as in this case, high ranking senior government officials, on third parties such as investors.
Although a large segment of the certification suggests that it is a process in which a central institutional actor with authority and status formally acknowledges that a venture meets a particular standard (Sine, David, and Mitsuhashi, 2007: 578; Rao, 1994) , another segment suggests that it is the association itself with such critical actors that represents an endorsement or certification (Kleer, 2010; Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012) . We focus on this latter body of literature where certification is created by status association. Status association has been especially important in the literature on entrepreneurial or small firms that lack legitimacy. For example, "drawing on arguments from liabilities of newness and certification literatures," Söderblom and colleagues (2015: 1501) find that receiving a government subsidy provides an endorsement for new ventures creating legitimacy for their business model and enabling them to receive more capital and enhance survival. Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999) report that newer firms entering into cooperative relationships with higher status partners enjoy the certification of legitimacy, because such relationships "act as endorsements that influence perceptions of the quality of young organizations when unambiguous measures of quality do not exist or cannot be observed" (p. 315).
Certification signals to investors and others about unobservable firm attributes that may contribute to its future performance and ability to continue as a "going concern" (King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005; Rindova et al., 2005) . A firm's associations with "long-lived players", such as senior officials in a one-party authoritarian government like China, in a policymaking process that is "far from transparent" (Kennedy, 2005: 52) , represent a valuable firm resource that is revealed to third parties, at least in part, through visits (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005) . In emerging economies, a firm's relationships with political actors contribute importantly towards competitive advantage (Peng and Luo, 2000) . Kennedy writes that business involvement in policymaking in China is typically non-confrontational and involves "sharing views" and company, and commended the firm's extraordinary efforts to self-develop core technology and independent innovation capability.
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Certification by authoritative institutional actors might affect the general impression that is formed about the firm's reputation and legitimacy. Reputation refers to the perceptions by external stakeholders about the firm's dispositions to behave in a particular manner (Basdeo et al., 2006) , ability to deliver along key dimensions of performance (Rindova and Fonbrun, 1999) and to create value (Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward, 2006: 54) . Hosting a visit puts a firm in contact with the most prominent member of the national government, a high status exchange partner (Rhee and Haunschild, 2006) , raising the firm's social prominence, a key component of organizational reputation (Rindova et al., 2005) . Shane and Foo (1999: 144) argue that certification by powerful institutional actors is one of the most important mechanisms for firms to gain "socio-political legitimacy," defined as the extent to which a firm conforms to recognized principles and standards (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994) . If a firm is perceived by third parties to have political and social capital, it may be able to enhance stakeholder cooperation and reduce stakeholder conflict, both of which are beneficial (Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey, 2014) . In sum, the certification function of hosting visits communicates externally about unobserved firm attributes and impressions about its reputation and legitimacy, all of which are associated with future value.
The presence of the Chinese President or Premier at company sites acts to reduce information asymmetries of investors about the firm's expectations of receipt of governmentcontrolled resources as well as elevate the firm's reputation and socio-political legitimacy via the certification effect. These pathways reduce the information search costs and increase investors'
confidence, leading to a decrease in the firm's costs of obtaining capital (Bosch and Steffen, 2011; Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005; Sine et al., 2007; Söderblom et al., 2015) and also may 14 increase perceptions about the firm's socio-political stability (Bertoni and Lugo, 2014 Furthermore, weak financial performance has been associated with negative reputation (Fombrun 15 and Shanley, 1990) . For poor performers, the visit reassures investors about the firm's reputation and legitimacy. In another context, Bertoni and Lugo (2011) demonstrate that sovereign wealth funds were more likely than other institutional investors to commit resources to distressed firms so that they became economically viable -as such, other investors received a certification effect from sovereign wealth fund participation. As a result of resource concerns and damage to reputation and legitimacy related to their performance, poorly performing firms are expected to experience a larger effect on their value from hosting than firms with stronger prior performance.
H2:
The positive relationship between hosting high ranking government officials and stock market reactions will be stronger when hosting firms have weaker prior financial performance.
Private Firms. China's economic transition led to the emergence of diverse ownership types for business enterprises (Jefferson and Su, 2006) . Prior to the economic reforms in 1978, the Chinese economy was dominated by SOEs and collectively-owned enterprises (Peng, Tan, and Tong, 2004) . Since the reforms, the Chinese economy witnessed a surge of privately owned firms, shareholding corporations, and foreign invested firms (Steinfeld, 2010 (Chen, Chen, and Xin, 2004; Li and Zhang, 2007; You and Du, 2012) , although the relationship is complex. On the one hand, some studies find that as senior managers and directors have more political connections, their firms will enjoy superior financial performance (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Li and Zhang, 2007; Peng and Luo, 2000) . On the other hand, other studies report that Chinese firms with extensive political connections innovate less (White et al., 2008) , retain fewer business experts on their boards (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007) , and realize worse financial performance (Nee, Opper, and Wong, 2007) than firms with fewer political connections.
Despite the ambiguity, we argue that firms with fewer political connections will benefit from visits by senior government officials more than firms with many political connections.
Hosting visits provides an opportunity for firms with fewer connections to have a direct pathway to key political decision-makers who control extensive resources. By fostering information exchange and relationship building government official's visits also help to lower the ex ante and ex post political exchange costs (Henisz and Zelner, 2005) for firms without previously personal ties to the government through their top managers. Hosting a visit puts a firm in contact with high status public officials (Rhee and Haunschild, 2006) , raising the firm's social prominence that is part of organizational reputation (Rindova et al., 2005) . Firms without many top manager ties to the government may especially enjoy the reputational benefits of hosting a visit.
H4:
The positive relationship between hosting high ranking government officials and stock market reactions will be stronger when the percentage of top managers with political connections is lower.
Location (Institutional Development) . The quality of local institutions plays an important role in the scope and cost of transactions (North, 1990) . Within China, institutional quality varies substantially across regions (Xu, 2011) . Where regional quality is strong, we expect that the discipline of the market pressures firms to strive to remain competitive. Several studies about
Chinese firms offer support; such as where regional institutions are strong, firms emphasize customer needs (Davies and Walters, 2004) , invest in R&D and intellectual property (Zhou, 2014) , and reinvest profits into the business (Cull and Xu, 2005 ) more so than their counterparts located in provinces with less developed formal institutions. In contrast, firms located in regions with weak formal institutions are less likely to be disciplined by markets (Chang and Wu, 2014) and may be less competitive than firms from more developed regions (Witt and Lewin, 2007) .
Firms may face higher levels of meddling by government officials in institutionally weak regions compared to stronger regions (Doh et al., 2003) .
A visit by senior government officials to a company located in a less developed region may communicate important information to investors. Since the rule of law is less developed in these regions, the state faces weaker constraints in exercising its power and thus firms (and other interests) are more dependent on their relationships with these state political actors than in more institutionally developed regions. Thus, a visit to a company in a less institutionally developed region signals that the firm needs political connections to access state-controlled resources.
Companies operating in less developed regions may also be seen as less reputable and have lower socio-political legitimacy ceteris paribus than companies in more developed regions (Shi, Sun, and Peng, 2012) . As such we predict the expected resources and reputation and legitimacy effects of a government official visit to companies in less institutionally developed regions may be greater than for companies located in higher institutionally developed regions.
H5:
The positive relationship between hosting high ranking government officials and stock market reactions will be stronger when hosting firms are located in less institutionally developed provinces.
METHODOLOGY Data
Our sample includes firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2003-2011. Firms listed on this stock exchange are larger, more prominent, and well-known than non-listed companies. During this timeframe, the Chinese government was led by President Hu and Premier Wen. We use the following criteria to select our sample firms. First, we consider a focal firm to be one that has hosted visits by The President or The Premier. We focus on the two top-level central government officials for three reasons. Foremost, as we mentioned previously, the President and the Premier are two most powerful political leaders in China and their visits received great attention from the media and investors. Second, visits by these two high-level central government officials, though brief, are rare and can be secretive in their planning and details of such officials' schedules may not be released beforehand. Thus, the market may not have much information about these events until they occur. Third, the visits of local government officials to firms are quite commonplace and therefore are not expected to send a valid signal of future resource flows to and bestow a strong certification effect on hosting companies.
Additionally, we exclude "Special Treatment" (ST) firms because its designation means a firm is in dire financial condition and may be delisted (Peng, Wei, and Yang, 2011 We also exclude two firms that hosted official visits that occurred just after their initial public offerings, because we are unable to collect prior stock price data necessary to calculate cumulative abnormal returns. Through these steps, we collect 84 visit events by President Hu and Premier Wen.
The source of our data on daily stock prices is the China Stock Market Trading Database (CSMAR). Firm financial and other data are also collected from CSMAR. We collected lowerlevel officials visit data and top managers' political background information from company websites and other sources.
Variables
Our dependent variable, cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each firm, is calculated through the event study methodology, explained in detail below.
We use four independent variables to test the second order hypotheses. To measure firm financial performance, we use return on assets (ROA) lagged one year prior to the visit. Private firm is a dummy variable that is coded as "1" if a firm's controlling shareholder is not the Chinese central or local government and "0" otherwise. Percentage of top managers with political connections is measured as the percentage of top managers with political connections.
We deem a top manager having political connections if he or she has worked in the government (Fan et al., 2007) . We consider the level of institutional development of the province where the focal firm is headquartered, using data from the NERI Index (Fan and Wang, 2011 (Peng and Luo, 2000) . We control for debt ratio (total long-term debt divided by total assets) because firms with high leverage are in a more urgent need of resources and legitimacy potentially produced by visits. We control for R&D intensity as the ratio of the number of R&D personnel divided by the total number of employees (Scherer, 1965 ) because high level of information asymmetry is associated with R&D intensive firms. We control for stock return volatility as firms with high stock return volatility may experience a larger CAR in the presence of visits. Stock return volatility is measured as the standard deviation of prior year's monthly stock returns. We also include the following variables related to firm governance. We control for ownership concentration, measured as the Herfindahl index of the top ten owners, because ownership concentration influences investors' evaluation of a firm (Wruck, 1989) . We control for board independence and CEO duality because these two variables are related to firm governance quality (Dalton et al., 2007) which in turn influences investors' evaluation of a firm.
Furthermore, we include the following variables to rule out alternative explanations. We control for industry concentration, measured by using the common four-firm concentration ratio (Shepherd, 1990) for each industry based on the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) industry classification, because it may be related to the returns from CPA (Esty and Caves, 1983 ) and partial out industry-related effects. We control for gross domestic growth rate for the province where a firm is located because the economic condition of the province where a firm is located may affect investors' sentiments. We also control for a firm's political capital by counting the accumulative number of visit officials (provincial, ministerial, and municipal-level political leaders) in a year. Because this variable is highly skewed, we take the natural log of the variable plus one. We control for change in firm visibility because visits by high-level officials can increase firm visibility which in turn can influence stock price. To create this measure, we conduct keyword searches, using Baidu, the most widely used search engine in China, on news about both treatment and control firms before and after a visit date. to visits because this period could be contaminated by potential leakage about these visits. We use the difference between post-visit firm visibility and pre-visit firm visibility to measure the change in firm visibility. The value of change in firm visibility is highly skewed and can be negative. To address skewness, we identify the minimum value of change in firm visibility and take the natural logarithm of (change in firm visibility + |minimum value of change in firm visibility| + 1).
Empirical Strategy
The most straightforward strategy to test Hypothesis 1 is to examine whether firms hosting official visits experience positive stock returns compared with the situation in the absence of such visits (i.e., the counterfactual). To test Hypotheses 2-5, we could investigate whether factors proposed in these hypotheses influence the variation of CARs among hosting
firms. Yet, unobservable firm characteristics and events may drive whether a firm receives a visit and stock market reactions. For instance, favorable industry events may coincide with the official's visit, yielding positive stock market reactions and confounding the visit's influence. To attenuate biases arising from unobservable firm characteristics and events, we identify hosting firms' comparable peers and compare stock market performance of hosts with that of peers.
We form a matched sample of control companies that did not receive visits from high ranking government officials. We first exactly match on CSRC industry classifications and visit years. We then match on a propensity score estimated based on firm size (the natural log of total assets), firm performance (ROA), and firm value (Tobin's Q). We use a logit regression to estimate the propensity score. We conduct t-tests to verify whether non-hosting (control) firms and hosting (treatment) firms differ from each other along firm size, firm performance, and firm value. Results from t-tests indicate that hosting and non-hosting firms do not significantly differ from each other along our matching criteria.
To investigate the change in the value of the firm resulting from the visits by high ranking governmental officials, we adopt the event study methodology in Brown and Warner (1985) and McWilliams and Siegel (1997) . Event studies are oftentimes used to evaluate firm-23 specific outcomes from political events (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Milyo, 2014) and in strategy studies using Chinese stock market data (Gaur, Maholtra, and Zhu, 2013) . We select an event window of [0, +1] , meaning that we consider the day of the event and the next day. We believe that a two-day event window captures the market reaction to the official's visits while minimizing the potential for confounding events that may occur during the window.
The estimation window is [-210, -11] , which covers 200 trading days for each firm between 210 days and 10 days prior to the event, with at least 30-day's stock return data available. The abnormal return for the portfolio, ARt, on day t is estimated by:
where Rt is the daily stock return and Rmt is the daily total-value-weighted congregated market returns on day t. Abnormal returns are residuals from the standard market model as previously specified.
Cumulative abnormal returns, CARt, for the portfolio between [0, +1] are calculated by summing abnormal returns:
We have 84 cases in our sample of officials' visits. Following the same procedure, we calculate CARs for non-hosting firms based on the hosting firms' visit dates.
To ameliorate biases from unobservable firm characteristics and events, we follow Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012) and include a control for treatment in regressions used to test our hypotheses. Specifically, we first run a standard probit regression with whether a firm received a visit as dependent variable. In the first-stage probit regression, we include all the variables used to predict CARs. To ensure identification of the model, we need an instrumental variable that influences whether a firm receives a visit or not but does not influence CARs 24 (Lennox, et al., 2012) . Our instrument is based upon a quasi-natural experiment introduced by the 2005 Split-Share Structure Reform (Liao, Liu, and Wang, 2014) . A characteristic of the Chinese capital market before the Reform was a split-share structure where almost 70% of listed firms' outstanding shares were non-tradable shares and mainly held by stockholders, including controlling shareholders, whereas the remaining shares were tradable and mostly held by domestic individuals and institutional investors (Liao et al., 2014) . In 2005, the CSRC introduced the Split-Share Structure Reform to convert non-tradable shares into tradable shares.
Participation in the Split-Share Structure Reform was mandatory.
Specifically, the instrument is a pre-reform dummy that receives a value of "1" for firms otherwise. This instrument is relevant because the government may have the need to understand firms that would go through the Reform and choose to visit these firms. Because the Reform was at the discretion of the Chinese government and individual firms had no direct control over the Reform, our instrument can be perceived as exogenous to firm CARs. Based on the first-stage regression, we calculate the treatment correction (Greene, 2012; Heckman, 1979; Lennox, et al., 2012) and include it as a control in the second-stage regressions. Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for both hosting and non-hosting firms. The correlation between hosting firms (versus non-hosting firms) and CAR is 22% and statistically significant.
RESULTS
[Insert Table 1 about here] Table 2 shows the differences in CAR between treatment and control firms. The CAR for treatment firms is 0.9% whereas the CAR for control firms is -0.5% and the difference is 25 statistically significant based on t-test (t = 2.89), consistent with Hypothesis 1. In addition, we find that hosting firms' CARs are statistically different from "0" as its confidence interval does not include "0" (t = 2.60), but non-hosting firms' CARs are not statistically different from "0" as its confidence interval includes "0" (t = -1.46).
[Insert Table 2 about here]
In addition, Figure 1 plots the average CARs for the hosting and non-hosting firms from day (-7) to day (+14). We do not find a significant difference for the average CARs prior to day (0) [i.e., CAR(-7,-1)], and the difference shows up at day (0) [Insert Figure 1 about here] Table 3 reports results used to test our hypotheses. Model 1 is the first-stage probit regression used to predict whether a firm receives a visit within a firm year. The coefficient estimate of pre-reform dummy is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.548, p = 0.043).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
To test our hypotheses, we use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions as some companies in our sample have hosted multiple visits by high-level officials during the 2003-2011 period. We cluster standard errors by firms to address potential residual correlation of the same firm (Petersen, 2009) . Model 2 in Table 3 introduces Hosting firm, a dummy variable that receives a value of "1" if a firm receives a visit and "0" otherwise. Additionally, conducting non-random post hoc analysis, we collected data from the footnotes of annual reports on all kinds of subsidies that firms received from the government during the two years after the visits. We find that firms that hosted a visit on average received a subsidy of RMB 912 million Yuan and comparable non-hosting firms on average received a subsidy of RMB 271 million Yuan and the difference is statistically significant (t = 2.2). This finding appears consistent with the resource flows argument, suggesting that resources flow to firms after the visits consistent with our promotion and protection arguments and providing some evidence regarding actual effect size.
The second pathway that a visit might influence investors' reactions is through the certification effect. The certification effect of the firm's association with powerful and prestigious government officials, high status exchange partners (Rhee and Haunschild, 2006) , raises a firm's social prominence, which feeds into its reputation and socio-political legitimacy.
Reputation refers to the perceptions by external stakeholders about the firm's dispositions to behave in a particular manner (Basdeo et al., 2006) and its ability to deliver along key dimensions of performance (Rindova and Fombrun, 1999) and create value . Socio-political legitimacy describes that match of a firm's activities to recognized principles and standards (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994) . The initial analysis shows that investors 29 positively value the firms that host such visits. For example, in a visit to KPC Pharmaceuticals in October of 2004, Premier Wen praised the firm for its investments in production equipment and quality control processes that allowed it to produce medicines of the highest quality.
The results from the secondary analysis predominantly support the dual pathways about hosting's effect on investor valuation. First, firms with weaker financial performance received a positive financial boost from government official visits. It appears that the visits of these high ranking officials signal to investors that the government has positive preferences towards such firms and will free up resources, lowering the uncertainty. As financially weaker firms suffer from lower reputations, visits might certify leaders' confidence raising the hosting firm's reputation and legitimacy. Private firms also benefited more than SOEs from hosting visits.
Visits indicate that private firms have access to government-controlled resources that complement their market strategies, something that private firms generally are disadvantaged compared to SOEs. Visits also create publicity which appears to elevate the reputation of private firms more than SOEs. Shareholders have been seen to value a private firm's reputation and legitimacy (Barnett, 2007) .
However, our results fail to support Hypotheses 4 and 5, which stated that stock market reactions are expected to be greater for firms with fewer top managers' political connections and for firms located in institutionally less developed provinces. This may imply that the signal of future resource flows and the certification effect of hosting high ranking government official visits were sufficiently great to be enjoyed by all the hosts regardless of their prior political connections or where they are based. (Jia, 2014) , and corporate social responsibility (Henisz et al., 2014) .
Limitations and Future Research
Lastly, although we undertake efforts to mitigate endogeneity concerns (e.g., matching sample and inclusion of a treatment correction control), these econometric methods rely on their specific assumptions. Future research may use natural experiments (e.g., Fisman, 2001 ) to empirically tease out how hosting official visits may influence investors' perceptions.
CONCLUSION
Hosting visits of high ranking government officials, an emergent CPA strategy, appears to be valuable for firms. Our examination confirms that firms hosting visits of the President and Premier experienced significant financial gains over similar non-hosting firms. Furthermore, the firms that benefited the most were those with weaker prior period profits and those with private (not state) ownership. Overall, we argue that firms' performance is expected to improve based upon two effects of hosting visits. First, hosting a visit signals that the government might be willing to furnish resources benefiting the host or its sector. For example, the government might be willing to release resources to promote the sector, such as favorable financing for investments in the government's preferred technologies or policies to push the firm's (and sector's) products into domestic and international markets. The government might also be willing to protect ailing firms; for example, provide grants to continue production in areas favored by senior government officials or enact regulations to limit competition. Second, hosting a visit may certify the reputation and the legitimacy of hosting firms. Because of the status association with high profile actors, certification improves the impression formed by third parties about the firm's reputation and legitimacy. The potential to receive government-controlled resources and enhance reputation and legitimacy makes hosting visits a valuable strategy for the hosting firms. 
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Notes:
Treatment group: firms (84) that hosted a visit of the President or Premier. Control group: non-hosting firms (84) that are matched to each host. Day 0 is the day of the visit. 
